Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

12-30-2021

Daniel Lakes v. U.S. Bank Trust, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 (Dec. 30,
2021)
Jessica Recarey-Valenzuela

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Daniel Lakes v. U.S. Bank Trust, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 (Dec. 30, 2021)1
PROPERTY LAW: ENSUING FORECLOSURE SALE DID NOT EXTINGUISH THE FIRST
DEED OF TRUST
Summary:
No issue of material fact exists in this case because the undisputed evidence confirms that
the first deed-of-trust beneficiary protected its interest in the property when it tendered the
superpriority part of the Home Owners’ Association’s lien prior to the foreclosure sale. The
Court was not persuaded by the appellant’s argument that the respondent cannot enforce its firstpriority interest since the appellant recorded his grant, bargain, and sale deed prior to the
respondent recorded its assignment as first deed-of-trust beneficiary. The appellant bought
interest in property subject to the first deed-of trust lien that was recorded years before his
purchase. Therefore, the appellant recording his deed prior to respondent’s recording of the
assignment does not influence the respondent’s right to enforce its lien since the assignment did
not change the appellant’s subordinate interest. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling
quieting title in respondent’s favor.
Facts and Procedural History:
A borrower bought the underlying property using a loan secured by a first deed of trust
that was duly recorded with the Clark County Recorder in April 2007. Freddie Mac purchased
the loan in May 2007. Then in 2008, the Home Owners Association (“HOA”) recorded a lien on
the property for $625.04 in delinquent assessments. The lender’s nominee recorded an
assignment of the deed of trust one month later to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Freddie Mac’s
loan servicer. The HOA recorded a notice of default and election to sell the property with the
amount owed being $1,668.57 that same month. Then in April 2015, the HOA recorded a notice
of foreclosure sale stating that the property was in default under the lien for delinquent
assessments recorded in 2008. The HOA accepted Ocwen’s tender of $3,241.52 to satisfy the
superpriority part of the lien. However, in August 2015, the HOA still foreclosed on its lien. In
January 2016, the final conveyance was made to appellant Daniel Lakes. The conveyance was by
a grant, bargain, and sale deed that explicitly stated that Lakes’s interest was subject to any
claims, encumbrances or liens. In January 2016, Lakes recorded the deed. In December 2015,
respondent U.S. Bank Trust obtained the loan from Freddie Mac and Ocwen assigned the first
deed of trust to U.S. Bank Trust in May 2016. In May 2016, Ocwen recorded the assignment in
the Clark County Recorder’s Office. Then both Lakes and U.S. Bank Trust sought quiet title.
The district court granted U.S. Bank Trust’s motion for summary judgment. The district
court found that Lakes “took title to the property subject to U.S. Bank Trust’s first deed of trust
because the superpriority tender cured the default, such that the ensuing foreclosure sale did not
extinguish the first deed of trust.” The district court failed to accept Lake’s argument that he had
no notice of U.S. Bank Trust’s interest in the property; therefore, should have the title quieted in
his name as a bona fide purchaser. The district court concluded that “Lakes argument that U.S.
Bank’s interest in the Deed of Trust is void and unenforceable as to him pursuant to N.R.S. §
111.325 is without merit because the timing of the Assignment is immaterial to the HOA Sale
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not extinguishing the Deed of Trust.” The district court’s order was certified as final under
NRCP 54(b). Then the court of appeals reversed and remanded. The court of appeals concluded
that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Lakes’s status as a bona fide purchaser
because U.S. Bank Trust failed to record its assignment of the deed of trust prior to Lakes
recorded his grant, bargain, and sale deed. The Nevada Supreme Court granted U.S. Bank
Trust’s petition for review pursuant to NRAP 40B.
Discussion:
Lakes argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ocwen
tendered sufficient payment to cover the superpriority amount in the HOA’s lien. The record did
not expressly show what the superpriority amount was, but the Court inferred from the
admissible evidence that Ocwen tendered enough to satisfy the lien. The Court inferred that the
HOA’s lien could not have exceeded $625.04 because the HOA’s recorded lien of delinquent
assessments was for $625.04.2 Ocwen tendered the HOA $3,241.52 and the HOA accepted
payment. Therefore, the district court was proper in determining that Ocwen’s tender of payment
for $3,241.52 cured the default for the superpriority portion of the HOA’s lien and that the
subsequent foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. 3
The Court disagreed with Lakes’ argument pursuant to NRS 111.325 that U.S. Bank
Trust’s deed of trust is unenforceable because Lakes recorded his grant, bargain, and sale deed
prior to Ocwen recording the assignment of the deed of trust to U.S. Bank Trust. Pursuant to
NRS 111.325, unrecorded conveyances of real property “shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same real property, or any
portion thereof, where his or her own conveyance shall be first duly recorded.” 4 The statute does
not directly address the specific issue in this case: “whether a party who acquires the beneficial
interest in the first deed of trust by post-foreclosure assignment may enforce its interest therein
when another party who purchased the property downstream from the foreclosure sale (which
was void as to the interest secured by the deed of trust) records his grant, bargain, and sale deed
before the recording of the deed-of-trust assignment.” The Court concluded that “it does not
apply to allow Lakes to avoid all indebtedness on the property, including the duly recorded first
deed-of-trust lien” by interpreting the statute with “reason” in a manner that “harmonizes
legislative purpose and policy.”5

See NEV. REV. STAT.§ 116.3116(2) (2013) (describes that the superpriority piece of a HOA’s lien is the
“assessments for the common expenses . . . which would have become due . . . dueing the 9 months immediately
preceding institution of an action to enforce the line); Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 388 P.3d 226, 231 (2017) (identifying that serving a notice of delinquent assessments is the
commencement of an action to enforce the lien pursuant to the pre-2015 version of NRS 116.3116)
3
Diamond Spur, 427 P.3d at 118–21; see Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (reviewed a district
court order that granted summary judgement de novo); cf. Prop. Plus Invs., LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc. 401 P. 3d 728, 731–32 (2017) (observed that an HOA is required to restart the foreclosure procedure to impose
a second superpriority default).
4
NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.325 (2011).
5
Pascua v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 434 P.3d 287, 289 (2019) (Stating that the Court will “construe” an
issue when the statute’s language does not discuss it in a manner where “reason and public policy” indicates the
legislatures’ intent).
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In this case, Lakes is not considered a subsequent purchaser pursuant to NRS 111.325
because U.S. Bank Trust had the first deed of trust assigned to it about four months after Lakes
acquired the subordinate interest by the grant, bargain, and sale deed. Lakes’ interest was
subordinate because the property “was encumbered by a secured creditor’s senior lien” when
Lakes purchased the property in 2016. This encumbrance was shown by the “duly recoded first
deed of trust.” The HOA possessed interest in only its “subpriority claims for assessments and
related fees” on the day of the foreclosure sale. The recording statute’s purpose is to protect
those that truly believe they are getting a good title. 6
A “post-foreclosure, off-record deed-of-trust assignment” was not material to Lakes’s
title because “the deed-of-trust lien recorded in 2007 was enforceable against the property when
Lakes purchased his interest in 2016.” Lakes’s deed reflects that the property was not sold “free
and clear of all claims, liens, and encumbrances.” Further, Lakes bought title “subject to the
recorded first deed-of-trust lien.” The statutory recording requirement for the assignment and the
May 2016 assignment to U.S. Bank Trust did not alter Lakes’s interest from January 2016. 7
Therefore, the parties do not have conflicting claims to the interest because Lakes’s
property interest was subordinate to the first deed-of-trust lien that continued unfulfilled. The
interest is not affected even if the beneficiary of the first deed of trust assigned its interest to
another party. Further, notice of the first-priority lien was provided through the 2007 recorded
first deed of trust, regardless of the beneficiary. Any purchaser in this situation would have
constructive notice of the deed-of-trust lien; therefore, it would not be possible for a bona fide
purchaser to exist.8 Without a record of satisfaction9 or ten years after the maturity date, 10 the
lien could not be assumed.
Pursuant to NRS 106.210, U.S. Bank Trust’s deed-of-trust lien is enforceable. NRS
106.210 states that those assignments need to be recorded prior to the assignee exercising the
power of sale.11 NRS 111.325 and NRS 106.210 are complementary. NRS 111.325 permits
evasion of “unrecorded instruments against subsequent bona fide purchasers for valuable
consideration. NRS 106.210 requires that to be enforced “any assignment of the beneficial
interest under a deed of trust must be recorded”, and “the trustee under the deed of trust may not
See SFR Inv. Pool 1, LLC v. First Horizon Home Loans, 409 P3.d 891, 893 (2018) (“The very purpose of
recording statutes is to impart notice to a subsequent purchaser.”); Allison Steel Mfg. co v. Bentonite, Inc., 471 P 2.d
666, 668 (1970)(“recording statutes provide ‘constructive notice’ of the existence of an outstanding interest in land,
thereby putting a prospective purchaser on notice that he may not be getting all he expected.”); see Bank of Am.,
N.A. v. Casey 52 N.E.3d 1030, 1035 (Mass. 2016) (Discussing that the state’s recording statute “requires that a
mortgage be recorded . . . in order to provide effective notice to anyone beyond the parties to the mortgage
transaction and those with actual notice of it”).
7
Cf. Kapila v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 184 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (found that after the mortgagor files
for bankruptcy the owner of a mortgage interest can transfer the interest because “the perfected mortgage is neither
actually nor potentially the property of the debtor,” that only has the legal title, instead of an equitable interest, in the
mortgaged property).
8
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.320.
9
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.260–106.270.
10
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.240.
11
Lakes used Allen v. Webb, 485 P.2d 677, 678 (1971), in his supplemental reply brief to support his position as a
bona fide purchaser and his interpretation of NRS 111.325. However, Allen is not applicable because it deals with
recording a new deed of trust.
6

exercise the power of sale pursuant to NRS 107.080 unless and until the assignment is
recorded.”12 Lakes’s purchase of the property was not induced due to U.S. Bank Trust’s failing
to record the assignment until May 2016. Additionally, Lakes was not prejudiced by U.S. Bank
Trust recording the assignment after the foreclosure because the first deed of trust was not
released when the HOA foreclosed on its subordinate lien. Therefore, Lakes’s notice of the
deed-of-trust assignment’s existence was not impacted by the fact that it was not recorded until
after Lakes took the title.
Conclusion:
The district court properly decided that U.S. Bank Trust could enforce its deed-of-trust
lien pursuant to NRS 106.210 because U.S. Bank Trust recorded its assignment prior to its
counterclaim to quiet title and Lakes is not considered a subsequent purchased pursuant to NRS
111.325.

12

NEV. REV. STAT §106.210.

